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The region along the Russo-Chinese border occu­
pied a prominent spot in the global geopolitical pic­
ture of the British political geographer, Sir Hal­
ford Mackinder, who expounded his famous theory 
that sea power played a supreme role in military 
strategies. At that time many strategists believed 
that victory in war depended upon the command of 
the sea. According to Mackinder, there was one 
impregnable fortress which was fully immune to 
any sea-based attack. He named that fortress Asia­
tic Pivot or Heartland.
It was an area encircled by mountains, deserts, 
and frozen seas. Mackinder described the area in 
his famous statement:
«Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; 
Who rules the World Island commands the World.»
His Pivot Area included the present Soviet Union, 
China’s Sinkiang, and all of Mongolia. Practically, 
all of this Pivot Area is now in the hands of two 
giant communist nations, the Soviet Union and Chi­
na, which are no longer a single communist mono­
lith. They have drifted apart, and can hardly be de­
scribed as nations on friendly terms.
Quite often, when making comparisons between 
the two giant communist states, the Soviet Union 
and China, some writers trace the similarity in the 
population composition of these two countries. How­
ever, there are certain differences in the ethnic com­
position of these countries. Almost eighty per cent 
of the Soviet Union’s population belongs to three 
Russian branches, and only about twenty per cent 
of the people, who are ethnically different from them, 
are not Russians. This picture of the supposedly mul­
tinational state is even more striking in China, where 
only six per cent of the population is non-Chinese.
These national minority groups in China are 
settled mainly along the borders of the country, 
principally in the north, all the way from Manchuria 
to Sinkiang and Tibet, as well as along the south­
western border of the country. Again, not many 
people realize that the bulk of China’s enormous 
population numbering more than 800 million people, 
resides in one-third of its total area, east of an ima­
ginary line drawn from Aigun in Manchuria to the 
Burmese border. Only slightly more than ten per 
cent of the people live in the western two-third of 
the country. Furthermore, the Chinese or Han peo­
ple, are in the minority on 60 per cent of the to­
tal area of the country. This uneven distribution of the 
population makes the national minorities of the coun­
try more important than they should have boon, 
especially if we remember that these minority groups 
comprise only six per cent of the total population. 
This geographic distribution of minority groups,
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in particular along the Sino-Soviet border, is a very 
important factor in the study of these groups.
The Chinese are well aware of this lopsided distri­
bution of the population, and have been trying hard 
to bring more Chinese settlers to the borderlands. 
In some areas they succeeded in changing the ratio 
in their favor, in others—they are still a minority. 
In two border regions, Manchuria and Inner Mongo­
lia, where the Chinese were in the minority several 
decades ago, they have been able to increase the total 
population and make these regions predominantly 
Chinese. This task was accomplished by bringing 
many millions of Chinese farmers into Manchuria 
even before the advent of communism in China. 
Ever since the Russians built the Chinese Eastern 
Railway in Manchuria with its branch line, formerly 
known as the South Manchuria Railway, leading to 
Port-Arthur in the south, millions of Chinese farmers 
from the overpopulated Shantung and neighboring 
provinces have poured into Manchuria. These im­
migrants used the rail lines as funnels through which 
they flowed in and actually secured areas, formerly 
considered empty wastelands.
In Inner Mongolia the Chinese increased their 
own numbers not only by resettling large numbers 
of Chinese peasants, but also by skillful «gerry­
mandering,» i.e. by incorporating parts of Chinese 
provinces into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Re­
gion. These provinces were Ninghsia, Suyuan, and 
Chahar.
The remaining two border regions—Sinkiang and 
Tibet still have rather small Chinese ethnic groups, 
and in fact only ten per cent of the Sinkiang popula­
tion is Chinese, while the remaining 90 per cent are 
people belonging to national minorities; some are 
members of the Turkic linguistic family, while others 
are members of the Mongolian family. A similar 
situation exists in Tibet, where the Chinese are still 
a definite minority.
The national minorities in China, by the official 
1953 count, amounted to 35.3 million people or over 
six per cent of the total population at that time. The 
largest minority group is the Chuang, which accounts 
for more than 6.6 million people. However, this group 
chiefly resides in the southwestern part of the country, 
and, therefore, is outside of the scope of this discus­
sion. Next come the Uighurswith 3.6 million people, 
the Hui with 3.5 million people, Tibetans with 2.6 
million, Manchu-2.4 million, Mongols-1.5 million, and 
Koreans - 1.1 million. A major proportion of these 
minority groups resides along the Sino-Soviet bor­
der. Insignificant as they are in the face of the count­
less millions of Chinese, they are, nevertheless, actual­
ly a majority in several outlying regions of China.
The Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, for 
example, is settled predominantly by Uighurs (more
than 75 per cent of the total), who are people of 
the Turkic linguistic family, closely related to an­
other language group, the Uzbeks. In addition, a large 
group of Hui also live in Sinkiang. The other large 
territorial regions of China, where a non-Chinese 
population is in a majority, are Tibet, and the former 
Sinkiang Province.1
Border regions between China and Russia can be 
rightfully called classical irredenta areas where the 
native population on both sides of the border is 
ethnically the same and represents a majority. Both 
the Chinese and Russians on either side of the north­
western border between China and Russia are in a 
minority. There are Uighurs, Kazakhs, Tadjiks, Kir­
ghiz, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Mongols along the bor­
der in both Chinese and Russian territory, and they 
represent the majority of people in Chinese Sinkiang 
and in Russian Central Asia. Before the Russian Rev­
olution of 1917, these native groups wandered freely 
across the border, freely intermarried, and, in 
fact, did not feel that they were either the subjects 
of the Russian Tsar or of the Chinese Emperor. 
Administrative control on both sides of the border 
was practically non-existent, particularly on the Chi­
nese side, which was so far away from the admin­
istrative and industrial centers of the country that 
the region was practically autonomous, if not de 
facto independent. A classical example was that 
Chinese officials often had to travel through Manchu­
ria and via Russian railroads and highways in Si­
beria to reach Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang).
There is no question that the geopolitical structure 
of the population on both sides of the Sino-Soviet 
border in the Central Asian region is the most ex­
plosive and apt to create a dangerous political situa­
tion. The Chinese administration is looking north­
ward across the border with a certain amount of 
anxiety which is understandable, since there are 
more than 35 million people in the Soviet part of 
Central Asia, and only six or seven million in Chi­
nese Sinkiang, south of the border.
With the strengthening of administrative control 
on both sides of the border, the situation became even 
more dangerous because the national minorities 
became restive and indignant at the curtailment of 
their traditional liberties. The Kazakhs and Uzbeks 
on one side of the border could not understand why 
could not they visit their cousins on the other side. 
This led to numerous incidents, minor and major 
riots, and even rebellions, more on the Chinese side 
than on the Russian for the reason that the Soviets 
exercised much firmer control over their border areas.
1. Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 3rd ed., Voi. 4, 1959, 
p. 805; Nash Drug-Kitay (Our Friend-China), Handbook, 
Moscow, 1959, pp. 262-263; Kratkaya Geograficheskaya 
Entsiklopediya, Voi. 2, 1961, p. 295, Moscow.
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In the beginning of the Soviet rule, the Russians 
had to cope with a very serious Turkic rebellion, led 
first by the spectacular Turkish adventurer, Enver 
Pasha, a former member of the «Young Turks» group 
in Turkey. This Turkish general decided to take 
advantage of the internal strife in Russia, where the 
Civil War was gradually coming to an end, and of 
the weakness of the Russian State. He attempted to 
undertake the tremendous task of uniting between 
thirty and forty million Turkic people living along 
the Chine se-Russian border with those who lived in 
Turkey, and to create a new great Turkic State of about 
100 million people. His ambitious scheme came to an 
end in Russian Central Asiawhere he was killed in 1922 
during one of his raids on Russian territory. Isolated 
raids of his remaining «Basmachi» bands into Rus­
sian Central Asia continued to plague the Soviets for 
some years. While the Soviet Union was able to se­
cure its region adjacent to the Chinese border be­
cause of better communication and transportation 
systems and firmer control over the entire territo­
ry, the Chinese Government of Chiang Kai-shek had 
very limited control over Sinkiang, where various 
minority groups were vying for a dominant position.
The majority of national minorities in Sinkiang 
had one cohesive force which united them in re­
sisting the attempts of the Chinese to control the re­
gion. This unifying force was their common religion 
of Islam. When the Moslem people were oppressed by 
the Communist authorities in Russia, they packed 
their tents, gathered their cattle and horses, and moved 
en masse across the border into Chinese Sinkiang, 
where they found a refuge. However, in recent years, 
the Chinese Communist administration, after the 
completion of the construction of the railroad to 
Urumchi, the capital of Sinkiang, started to exercise 
a firmer control coupled with limitations of the tra­
ditional liberties and freedoms of these people, 
many of whom were still nomads. The people exploded 
and several riots occurred in a few cities of Sin­
kiang. These riots were crushed with the utmost cru­
elty. The result was that the nomads again packed 
their «gher» or «yurts» (felt tents), and thousands of 
them crossed the border into the Soviet Union.
The policy of the Chinese Communist government 
in Peking to eliminate religion in the region caused a 
new resentment and discontent. Cruelty has not stop­
ped the spirit of revolt as was evidenced by recent 
events in Sinkiang, when many thousands of Kazakhs, 
Uighurs, Kirghiz, and others stormed Chinese Com­
munist headquarters in Kuldja (I-ning) and other ma­
jor cities only tobe met by a rain of bullets. The dis­
content of the native Turkic people reached such pro­
portions, that the Peking Government could no long­
er hide it, especially as thousands of refugees reached 
sanctuary in the Soviet territories of Central Asia.
According to Tom Stacey, the British correspon­
dent of the London Sunday News, no less than 100,000 
persons crossed the border in just three years, in 
the early thirties. There were three reasons for this 
mass migration: hunger, the ruthlessness of the Com­
munist Chinese, and the attempts of the mass set­
tlement of Chinese immigrants in parts of Sinkiang.1 
Some of these Chinese immigrants were soldiers of 
the PLA (People’s Liberation Army).
The same source mentioned that Chinese officials 
have acknowledged that there were serious problems 
in the area: problems which they called «local nation­
alism» and «counter-revolutionary activity.» The 
situation in Sinkiang has been especially serious since
1958, some fourteen years ago, although some riots 
and uprisings there have been in evidence even ear­
lier, since 1954. In 1963 the Chinese authorities open­
ly accused the Soviet Union of fomenting illegal acti­
vities among the national minorities in Sinkiang. 
In fact, both the People’s Daily in Peking and the 
magazine, Red Flag, vigorously protested that So­
viet leaders in April and May 1962, «used their or­
gans and personnel in Sinkiang, China to carry out 
subversive activities in the Hi region, and enticed and 
coerced tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into 
going to the Soviet Union.»2
The year 1962 saw the most serious outbreaks of 
riots and uprisings in Sinkiang. The one at Kuldja, 
which is the capital of the Hi Kazakh autonomous 
chou, was especially interesting and significant 
since the local Kazakhs decided to put their fate into 
the hands of the Soviet consulate there. A large crowd 
of demonstrators gathered in front of the Soviet 
consulate demanding military aid for an «independ­
ent movement.» When this aid was refused, they 
started to cross the border into the Soviet Union. 
Another uprising took place in Chuguchac (T’a-ch’ 
eng) where the Kazakhs attacked Chinese government 
offices and an army building. In most cases the riots 
were cruelly suppressed.3
Another source gives a recapitulation of serious 
disturbances in Sinkiang, starting with an uprising 
in the region of I-ning (Kuldja) and T’a-ch’eng (Chu- 
guchak) in 1956. There were a series of disturbances 
throughout Sinkiang and Tsinghai in 1957, very se­
rious disturbances throughout Sinkiang in 1958 and
1959, andfinally another serious uprising in 1962when 
thousands fled to the Soviet Union. The latter is the 
uprising which the Chinese blamed on Soviet officials 
in their statements of 1963.4
1. Tom Stacey, London Sunday Times, December 8, 1963.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. K. Pavlov, «At the Meeting-Point Between Two Commu­
nist Empires,» Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the 
USSR, Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan. 1964, p. 23 (Muenich, Germany).
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It was ία 1958 that the Chinese openly acknowledged 
the existence of separatist movements in the bor­
der regions. One article indicated that «the idea of 
local nationalism has witnessed new growth and has 
already become a dangerous trend which requires 
strict vigilance.»1 It is significant that this article 
stated openly that among the national minorities, i.e. 
Mongols, Koreans, Uighurs, and others, there were 
people who demanded the establishment of a «Con­
federate Republic.» The Uighurs went even farther 
and demanded that Sinkiang be changed into an 
«Independent Uighurstan Government.» Perhaps 
the most serious movement was when the people of 
Sinkiang wanted to found a republic which they want­
ed to name, according to the Sinkiang Daily, the 
«Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan.»2 More­
over, according to the Kwang Ming Daily, there were 
people in Sinkiang, who were secretly planning and 
actually forming a «Moslem Kingdom.»3
Even among the Mongols, there were some «right­
ists» who presented their «reactionary demands,» 
complained the People’s Daily, for the separation of 
the Mongolian and Han Chinese administration, while 
some even demanded «Mongolian independence.»4
It is rather astonishing that in Manchuria, which is 
almost 95 per cent Chinese now, there was a move­
ment in the Heilungkiang Province, whose leader, 
Pu Lin, demanded recognition and autonomy for the 
Tungusic groups in Manchuria. The same paper 
lamented that among national minorities, some open­
ly declared that «it is all right not to have socialism; 
we want independence.»5 However, the Chinese were 
the most concerned with the attitude of the Islamic 
people of Sinkiang and Tibet, who even insisted 
that Arabia, their religious fatherland, was their 
country—not China. The Kansu Daily asserted that 
the Mohammedans considered Arabia their «Second 
Fatherland,» and some of them openly approached 
the government for permission to emigrate, asserting 
«the wish to return to settle down in Arabia.»6 And, 
finally, the Kwang Ming Daily wrote, «there are 
people who consider that the Han (Chinese) language 
belongs to the Hans, not to the indigenous national­
ity, and they maintain that each nationality should 
have its own language. Among the Mohammedans 
there are people who maintain that «Arabie» is the 
language of the Mohammedans.»7
1. Chiao-Hsueh yu Yen-chiu (Teaching and Research), No. 
6, June 1958, Peking.
2. Sinkiang Daily, December 17, 1957.
3. Kwang Ming Daily, Jan. 17, 1958; Chiao-Hsueh yu Yen- 
chiu, op. cit.
4. People s Daily, Feb. 14, 1957.
5. People's Daily, Jan. 11, 1958.
6. Kansu Daily, Jan. 23, 1958.
7. Kwang Ming Daily, Feb. 17, 1958.
This dangerous and rather explosive situation on 
a Sino-Soviet border, particularly along the border 
of Sinkiang and Manchuria, suddenly led to a flare 
-up of armed skirmishes at two widely separated bor­
der areas in 1968 and 1969. First, there were armed 
clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops over some 
islands (Damanski Island) in the Ussuri River, which 
were later followed by alleged incursions of Chinese 
Communist soldiers into the Soviet Central Asian 
regions. Again, armed clashes followed with casual­
ties on both sides. Since that time, an uneasy truce 
has been kept along this unstable border. All these 
events forced both sides to increase numbers of 
military units in border areas.
The Chinese Communist leaders have been deter­
mined to keep their border areas secure. To assure an 
effective control over the borderlands, they have been 
using two measures, which could be described as 
economic penetration and political infiltration. The 
PLA (Army) plays a great role in these attempts. 
To secure the borderlands economically, an ex­
tensive program has been devised to construct nu­
merous factories and plants. Manchuria, in this 
respect is better off than the other border regions, 
since it was and still is the major industrial region 
of the entire country. However, the other border re­
gions also are witnessing an increased tempo in in­
dustrial development.
Inner Mongolia has also received its share of at­
tention. The region formerly lacked any major in­
dustrial enterprise, as its Mongolian population was 
constantly moving in search of pastures for the heads 
of cattle and horses. While many Mongols are still 
nomads, those few thousand Chinese, who lived there 
in the past, were engaged mainly in agriculture. The 
Chinese Communists, to secure the region econom­
ically, created an imposing industrial base there 
by constructing the Paotow metallurgical complex. 
The agricultural side of the economy also received 
attention from the Chinese rulers. Since this region 
lacks sufficient precipitation, extensive irrigation sys­
tems have been developed with the result that the ir­
rigated area of the farming communities has in­
creased threefold since 1949.
A major step in bringing the region closer to the 
folds of the Chinese Communist State was to increase 
its Chinese population. Some Chinese sources now 
claim that the total population of the region has in­
creased from its original 1 million people to almost 
10 million. As was explained earlier, this was accom­
plished by incorporating the province of Suiyuan and 
parts of Ninghsia and Chahar into the Inner Mongo­
lian Autonomous Region. The region now is predom­
inantly Chinese with the Mongols a poor second, 
accounting for slightly over 1.3 million people, while 
the Chinese number close to 8 million. In addition,
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there are some Manchus, Koreans, Evenki, Orochens, 
Hui, Tungus, and others.1
The Northeastern border area of China, which 
in the past was known as Manchuria, demogra- 
phically was divided into two parts: northern and 
southern. The northern part at the turn of this 
century was very sparsely populated, and the Chinese 
there were a minority. Since the construction of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway by the Russians, the Chinese 
settlers started to move in along the newly construct­
ed rail line. This migration was on a small scale in 
the beginning, but reached the proportions of a 
deluge in the twenties. The population of North 
Manchuria in 1890 was calculated to be around 1.5 
million, among which, strangely enough, the Chinese 
were the minority. The great migration began in the 
early twenties. During just one decade, 1923 to 1932, 
between 300,000 and 900,000 new colonists-farmers 
were arriving annually in North Manchuria from other 
parts of China. The Chinese took advantage of the 
struggle for supremacy between Russia and Japan 
after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and 
started to move in. The Lytton Report of the League 
of Nations (1932) vividly stated that:
While Russia and Japan engaged in delimiting their res­
pective spheres of interest in North and South Manchuria, 
Chinese farmers took possession of the soil, and Manchu­
ria is now unalterably Chinese.2
The same opinion was expressed by Henry L. 
Stimson, who, describing (1936) the unsuccessful 
Japanese attempts to settle Manchuria with Japanese 
farmers, said that:
While the Japanese people as a whole have kept aloof, Chi­
nese farmers have moved in and occupied the soil. The last 
thirty years have witnessed one of the greatest popular 
migrations of world history. Nearly thirty millions of people 
are said to have poured northeastward from the crowded Chi­
nese provinces of Shantung and Hopei and have occupied 
Manchuria.3
There is no doubt that these millions of farmers 
who swarmed into rich and fertile Manchuria se­
cured this corner of the Chinese land for the country 
better than it could have been done by any administra­
tive measure.
Asa result of this Chinese colonization of Manchu­
ria the population of Manchuria started to increase 
rapidly. By 1930 there were 31-32 million people in 
Manchuria. The Japanese census of 1940 shows 39.2
1. Kwang-ming Jih-pao, Dec. 27, 1961, Peking; Druzhba, 
No. 37, Sept. 9, 1959, p. 6.
2. League of Nations, Commission of Inquiry into the Sino- 
Japanese Dispute, Report, 1932 (Lytton’s Report), p. 44.
3. Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis (New York:
Harper & Brothers Pubi., 1936), p. 18.
million people, and according to the data for 1945 
there were 46 million inhabitants. The figure is now 
exceeding 50 million.
Returning to the northwestern corner of the coun­
try, here lies Sinkiang, which has been renamed the 
Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. It is one of 
the five autonomous regions of the country which 
have large minority groups within their borders. 
Perhaps the most difficult task in the region was to 
organize the nomadic cattlemen and horsemen of 
Sinkiang into people’s communes, but again Chinese 
Communist sources proudly declared that they had 
been able to «entice» no less than 70 per cent of the 
nomadic horsemen into the communes by 1959.4 
When it comes to agriculture, only one per cent of the 
total area of the region was under cultivation in 1960, 
and it was concentrated along the river valleys and 
in isolated oases.5 This percentage of arable, cul­
tivated land has been slightly increased since. Ap­
parently, these determined efforts to cultivate more 
virgin lands have given some results, since it has been 
reported, for example, that within four years (1959- 
1962), more than 1.3 million hectares (2.2 million 
acres) of virgin land had been plowed and made pro­
ductive by the use of irrigation systems.
To summarize what has been said on the status 
of the border regions, populated by national mino­
rities, especially in the light of Peking’s open admis­
sions that it has been encountering difficulties in 
Sinkiang and other border regions, there is very lit­
tle doubt that discontent is still smouldering in these 
areas, although, any open uprising or revolt is ap­
parently doomed to failure. No matter how eager 
the native groups are to separate themselves from 
Communist China for nationalist or religious rea­
sons, their numbers are still too small. Some 35 mil­
lion people belonging to national minorities (a for­
midable figure elsewhere) have no chance of withstand­
ing the onslaught of more than 700 million Chinese. 
There are several drastic measures which the Chinese 
Communists could adopt to eliminate discontent 
among the national minorities: one is really drastic, 
and that is expelling native people from the border 
regions and resettling them in densely populated Chi­
nese provinces, and in exchange pouring Chinese 
farmers into the vacant lands; the other method is 
to move in additional Chinese military forces, with 
numerous officials and cadres, to maintain a stronger 
administration with full powers to deal strongly and 
effectively with any form of discontent. This seems 
to be the present policy of the Chinese Communist 
administration in the border regions, in Sinkiang 
in particular.
4. Nash Drug-Kitay, op. cit., p. 69.
5. Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, op. cit., Voi. 8,1960, 
p. 511.
116
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 02:48:14 |
explosive Sino - Soviet borderlands
It seems the old plan of Enver Pasha to unify Mos­
lem groups in China and Russia into one Moslem 
Central Asian State, and, perhaps, to unite all Tur­
kic nations, including Turkey, into one formidable 
Moslem State of 100 million, is still alive. True enough 
it is only smoldering, and its center is a small group 
of emigrees from Central Asia, now in Istanbul, 
Turkey. This group is trying to arouse an interest 
of Moslem countries in their cause, but, apparently, 
without any evident result, judging by their complaints 
in a Memorandum Concerning Turkistan, published 
by the above group in 1967. They bitterly stated that 
«the unbearable aspect of the problem is the indif­
ference and callousness shown in their cause by their 
co-nationalists and co-religionists.»1
There is not much this little group can do in the 
face of an apathy or indifference on the part of Mos­
lem nations, but to dream and draw maps of a uni­
fied Moslem State in Central Asia, which would in­
clude all five Soviet Union’s republics in Central Asia 
and the Sinkiang area of China.
As a postscript to this discussion of the geopoliti­
cal importance of the border regions along the long 
Sino-Soviet boundary, and particularly of China’s 
Northwestern regions, I would like to mention that 
it was in this region, the Lop Nor area, that the Chi­
nese Communist leaders selected a site for their 
atomic and nuclear installations.
The Soviet Union, during the time of cordial re­
lations between the two countries, provided techni­
cal assistance and personnel for the construction 
of China’s first atomic reactor. The first controlled 
chain reaction was achieved on June 13, 1958.
Chinese efforts to harness atomic energy go back 
to the year 1950, when both countries, the Soviet 
Union and Communist China, signed an agreement 
for the formation of the Nonferrous Metals and Rare 
Metals Joint Stock Corporation, which was to con­
duct a survey, search, and extraction of radioactive 
ores in Sinkiang and neighboring regions. Three 
years later, in 1953, an atomic energy experimental 
plant was constructed near Tihwa (Urumchi) in 
Sinkiang, which was directed by the well-known I- 
talian atomic scientist, Bruno Pontecorvo, a de­
fector from the West.
The next important step was taken in the fall of 
1962, when the Peking Government ordered all 
impo rtant physici st s from No rth and No rthea st Chi na 
to Sinkiang, where they were to engage in an accel­
1. A Memorandum Concerning Great Turkistan, SEHIR
Matbaasinda basilmistir, Istanbul, 1967.
erated program of nuclear research. This groud 
of eminent atomic scientists was headed by Dr. Tsien 
Hsueh-shen (Ch’ien Hsue-sen), who had spent sever­
al years in the United States, before returning to 
Communist China in 1955. These Chinese scientists 
were to start where the program was halted with the 
withdrawal of the Soviet scientists.
It is really ironic that the progress in nuclear re­
search and the consequent atomic bomb explosions 
in China are attributed to the teamwork of Chinese 
scientists headed by Dr. Tsien Hsueh-shen, formerly 
a professor at the California Institute of Technology 
(Caltech) in the Los Angeles area. Professor Tsien, 
a US Air Torce colonel, a director of the rocket sec­
tion of the US National Defense Scientific Advisory 
Board, a consultant to the US Navy, and head of 
the Institute’s department of rocket and jet propul­
sion, became the guiding light behind China’s nuclear 
program. Dr. Tsien, considered a missile genious, 
together with Dr. Chao Chung-yao, creator of the 
A-bomb in China, were responsible for the bomb 
test on October 16, 1964.
The location of the Chinese nuclear research in­
stallations in close proximity to the Soviet Central 
Asian regions has been of great concern to the Com­
munist rulers of China. As long as both countries 
were on the best of terms, as brother communist 
nations, there was nothing to fear. Now, however, 
the situation has drastically changed. There now 
exists the threat of a possible Soviet Russian attack 
on the Chinese nuclear research plants in the Lop 
Nor area, and also, the restive national minority 
groups in Sinkiang and in other border regions have 
been quite a problem.
Who could have imagined in the days of friendly 
relations between the two giant communist nations 
that they would split-up and follow different paths 
to their common goal? This possibility of a hostil­
ity, however, was suggested by this writer as far 
back as 1956 in an article written for the Royal Ge­
ographical Society in London, in which an opinion 
was expressed that these two friendly nations may 
eventually become ideological enemies. In that case, 
the province of Sinkiang with its newly constructed 
railway, now terminating at Urumchi, may become 
the invasion route for the Soviet military forces. 
By the same token, this railroad may become a 
dagger in the hands of the Chinese communists di­
rected at underbelly of the Soviet Empire.2
2. Victor P. Petrov, «New Railway Links Between China and 
the Soviet Union,» The Geographical Journal, London: The 
Royal Geographical Society, Vol. CXXH, Part 4, December 
1956, pp. 471-477.
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